4
2017

European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

EASTWEST
SCIENCE UNITES

ISSN 2414-2344

Austria, Vienna

European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences

№ 4, 2017

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

«East West» Association for Advanced Studies and Higher Education GmbH

Vienna
2017

European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences

Scientific journal

№ 4 2017

ISSN 2414-2344

Editor-in-chief Maier Erika, Germany, Doctor of Philology

International editorial board

Abdulkasimov Ali, Uzbekistan, Doctor of Geography
Abdulkasimov Ali, Uzbekistan, Doctor of Geography
Adieva Aynura Abduzhalalovna, Kyrgyzstan, Doctor of Economics
Arabaev Cholponkul Isaevich, Kyrgyzstan, Doctor of Law
Barlybaeva Saule Hatiyatovna, Kazakhstan, Doctor of History
Busch Petra, Austria, Doctor of Economics
Cherniavska Olena, Ukraine, Doctor of Economics
Garagonich Vasily Vasilyevich, Ukraine, Doctor of History
Jansarayeva Rima, Kazakhstan, Doctor of Law
Karabalaeva Gulmira, Kyrgyzstan, Doctor of Education
Kvinikadze Giorgi, Georgia, Doctor of Geographical Sciences
Kiseleva Anna Alexandrovna, Russia, Ph.D. of Political Sciences
Khoutyz Zaur, Russia, Doctor of Economics
Khoutyz Irina, Russia, Doctor of Philology
Kocherbaeva Aynura Anatolevna, Kyrgyzstan, Doctor of Economics
Konstantinova Slavka, Bulgaria, Doctor of History
Lewicka Jolanta, Poland, Doctor of Psychology
Massaro Alessandro, Italy, Doctor of Philosophy
Marianna A. Balasanian, Georgia, Doctor of Philology
Meymanov Bakyt Kattoevich, Kyrgyzstan, Doctor of Economics
Serebryakova Yulia Vadimovna, Russia, Ph.D. of Cultural Science
Shugurov Mark, Russia, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences
Suleymanova Rima, Russia, Doctor of History
Fazekas Alajos, Hungary, Doctor of Law

Proofreading Kristin Theissen
Cover design Andreas Vogel
Additional design Stephan Friedman

Editorial office European Science Review
"East West" Association for Advanced Studies and Higher Education GmbH, Am Gestade 1
1010 Vienna, Austria

Email: info@ew-a.org

Homepage: www.ew-a.org

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences is an international, German/English/Russian language, peer-reviewed journal. It is published bimonthly with circulation of 1000 copies.

The decisive criterion for accepting a manuscript for publication is scientific quality. All research articles published in this journal have undergone a rigorous peer review. Based on initial screening by the editors, each paper is anonymized and reviewed by at least two anonymous referees. Recommending the articles for publishing, the reviewers confirm that in their opinion the submitted article contains important or new scientific results.

Instructions for authors

Full instructions for manuscript preparation and submission can be found through the "East West" Association GmbH home page at: http://www.ew-a.org.

Material disclaimer

The opinions expressed in the conference proceedings do not necessarily reflect those of the «East West» Association for Advanced Studies and Higher Education GmbH, the editor, the editorial board, or the organization to which the authors are affiliated.

East West Association GmbH is not responsible for the stylistic content of the article. The responsibility for the stylistic content lies on an author of an article.

Included to the open access repositories:

Google eLIBRARY.RU DOI ULRICHSWEB INDEX COPERNICUS BASE EBSCO OpenAIRE RePEc Registry of Open Access Repositories (ROAR) WorldCat

© «East West» Association for Advanced Studies and Higher Education GmbH

All rights reserved; no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission of the Publisher.

Typeset in Berling by Ziegler Buchdruckerei, Linz, Austria.
Printed by «East West» Association for Advanced Studies and Higher Education GmbH, Vienna, Austria on acid-free paper.

Section 2. Cultural studies

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20534/EJHSS-17-4-15-24

'Goke A. Akinboye,
(Ph.D), Department of Classics,
University of Ibadan, Ibadan
E-mail: oyegoke4real@yahoo.com, oa.akinboye@mail.ui.edu.ng
Bosede Adefiola Adebowale,
(Ph.D), Department of Classics,
University of Ibadan, Ibadan
E-mail: olusegunbosede@gmail.com, bosere52@yahoo.com

THE THREE FACES OF GREEK AND ARISTOTELIAN RHETORIC

Abstract: The need for the persuasion is often informed by a dire or grave situation which one needs to wriggle out from. Persuasion may also be necessitated by a person's disposition to a subject, development, or topic in view. The art of persuasion through speech is what scholars, ancient and modern, call rhetoric or oratory. The Greek traditional theorists, who invented rhetoric, divided the art into three types: the judicial (dicanic or forensic), the deliberative (symbouleutic) and the demonstrative (epideictic). Broadly, Greek rhetoric also has a tripartite part: invention, arrangement and style. Similarly, by Aristotelian theory, rhetoric is the art of persuasion which functions by three means: by appeal to people's reason (*logos*); by the appeal to their emotions (*pathos*) and by the appeal of the speaker's personality or character (*ethos*). What exactly did the Greeks and, indeed, Aristotle mean by these terms and their functions? This paper, while highlighting the general conception of the Greek rhetoric and its three-way nature, surveys the Aristotelian tripartite division and functionality of rhetoric through a simple method of content analysis of selected ancient and modern texts. It submits that a *rhetor* (rhetorician/orator) is not firm in his trade if he does not artfully possess and execute the Aristotelian three modes of persuasion in contexts of necessity or grave situations.

Keywords: Greek rhetoric, oratory, Aristotle, ethos, pathos, logs.

Introduction

One of the major legacies of the Graeco-Romans and which has continued to be of profound utilitarian value in contemporary art is rhetoric. According to the classical tradition, the origin and growth of rhetoric is credited to the duo of Tisias and Corax, who flourished in the city-state of Syracuse on the Greek island of Sicily in the mid fifth century B. C. The invention took place after the expulsion of the city's tyrants and the Syracusans' enthronement of democracy. Right from the beginning of its civilization, the Greek society thrived on oral expression. This was evident not only in its system of politics as shall be seen below, but also in its plethora of literatures and philosophy which later became written after the epic poems had been invented. The

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

development of rhetoric was facilitated by the Greek discovery of democracy, a political system which operated through the direct speech of citizens in the *ekklesia* (assembly) and the courts. Complaints, defenses and appeals were verbally conveyed by citizens before the magistrates (*areopagus, boule, and heliaea*) and the public juries (*dikasteria*).

The fundamental principles of Greek *demokratia* had required *equality, freedom,* and *the rule of law.* This is true at least as far as Athens was concerned. The equality of all free adult male citizens (the *demos* — the many — who had the sovereign power) in formulating and deciding public policy was a cardinal feature of democratic theory. By this equality, firstly, we mean all the free adult male citizens had the fundamental right to speak and vote in the assembly (*ecclesia*), irrespective of birth, class, occupation, education, wealth, or anything else. Secondly, equality was secured by the composition of the executive Council (*boule*), which was the most fundamental of all Greek democratic constitutions, and, in effect, the principal committee of the assembly of the people. Thirdly, the principle of equality was enshrined in the composition of the panels of judges in the jury courts (the courts of the people – *demos*). The members of the Council were annually selected by lot from the whole adult male population of citizens irrespective of background or social status; the judges for the jury (supreme) courts were also appointed annually from the same adult male citizens who made up the assembly, though in this regard, they volunteered to serve. This type of Greek democracy held that the collective judgment of the whole demos meeting in assembly (*ecclesia*) to talk, debate and finally make decisions by majority vote, was superior to the judgment of any select hand of experts. It was, of course, recognized that the oral submission of certain professional or individual expert, within the particular field of his expertise, was superior in ability and judgment to the individual non-expert; but according to the theory of democracy, what was best for the community was the collective judgment of men of all classes, occupations, educational and wealth backgrounds.

This important aspect of the fundamental theory of *demokratia* emphasised that the Greeks had great faith in the speech and reasoning faculty of the common man. They had a profound belief in his critical wisdom and ability to deliberate and execute the ordinary business of public life. This idea, which clearly emerges from a passage of Plato's *Protagoras* sums up the Greek fundamentals. Socrates converses with his interlocutor, Protagoras (Plato, *Protagoras.* 319 b–323 a):

> *Socrates*: When the Athenian people gather for assembly, if the city has something to do about buildings, the advice of building-specialists is sought, if the business is ship-building, the shipwrights are called upon especially for their advice, and so on and so forth with everything that can be taught and learned. And in such cases, if any non-expert tries to interrupt with his own advice, the assembly refuses to listen to him however rich or aristocratic he may be, but jeers and boos the speaker until he either shuts up or is removed by the police. This is how the Athenian people behave on technical questions. But when the debate is on general questions of government, anyone gets up and gives his advice: carpenters, smiths, leather-workers, businessmen, ship-captains, rich or poor, noble or humble; and no one ever complains that the speaker is untrained in the subject under discussion.
>
> *Protagoras*: The natural gifts and accomplishments of men are varied, but all alike possess a natural sense of decency and fair-play. While decisions on technical questions require the advice of trained men, political decisions depend on justice and fair-play.

This takes us to the root of Greek participatory *demokratia:* the Greek democrat believed in the ability of the ordinary man to make sound speech and decisions whether on political issues, as speakers in the assembly, judges in the law courts, or in matters aesthetic though the place of the expert was fully

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

recognized (Thucydides. 2.36 ff.). Thus, in the language of Greek politics, *demokratia* is often synonymous with freedom (cf. Aristotle *Pol.* 1317a). The democracy did not mean, as Plato and others sometimes suggest, licence, chaos and anarchy where everyone was free to talk and do exactly what he liked. Plato himself must have known that this is nonsense (Plato, *Rep.* 8.557; etc; Barker, 2009: 336–7). *Demokratia,* rather, cherished individual freedom of action and of speech subject to the laws. This meant both personal and political freedom for the full citizen and even the resident foreigner, though the latter did not have the freedom to take an active part in government. But he had the liberty to speak his mind on political affairs. And so for an Athenian, talk was the breath of life for any man could speak in the assembly meeting if he could get others to listen. Unlike the highly regimented and totalitarian state of Sparta, where no one was allowed to carelessly make statement against its government, democratic Athens, flourished with men — satirists, comedians, philosophers, journalists, and so on — who were at liberty to talk and make public criticisms of fellow Athenians and their institutions.

Therefore, as seen above, the application of the famed Athenian democracy on a large scale to political meetings and judicial courts was a huge factor in the blossoming of rhetoric in Athens in the fifth century B. C. Given the above situation, the need arose for men of vocal power to bring their talents and abilities to bear on both the political and judicial spaces. In different city-states with varied challenges, the desire and ability to speak persuasively and convincingly became so expedient that men earnestly sought the services of teachers of oratory called *rhetors* who, in turn, developed theories for successful speech making and delivery. Success in this engagement circumstances depended on one's ability to persuade large audiences in the assembly or the courts, the latter of which became more important after the judicial reforms of Ephialtes in 462 (Worthington, 1994: 17).

The first band of notable Greek *rhetores,* as noted above, was Tisias and Corax, who actually taught techniques and methods of judicial oratory to those unaccustomed to public speaking especially at the law courts. It is said that while Corax was an orator who taught political speech, Tisias concentrated more on the writing of judicial speeches, especially those required during defences and appeals. Besides these, there were the sophists who travelled from *polis* to *polis,* teaching politics, philosophy and the art of persuasion to young citizens sometimes for some fees. It is said that rhetoric, as a self-conscious art, was extended by the sophists, especially Georgias (Diodorus Siculus, 12.53.2). In this group of early sophists belonged Protagoras, Georgias, Prodicus and Hippias who largely taught rhetoric as an important part of Greek education and civil life. The other batch of fifth century B. C. Attic *rhetores* was Isocrates and Lysias. Some of the distinguished disciples of these early rhetoricians include Demosthenes, Pericles, and Plato. Other lesser figures include Thrasymachus, Theodorus, Antiphon, Antisthene, Alcidamas, Theodectes, and others who either modified, improved or influenced the status, standards and forms of rhetoric — some improving on its definitions, style, structure, divisions, figures of speech, delivery, etc. (Kennedy, 1963: 52–80).

The traditional theory of Greek rhetoric: the tripartite kinds and the tripartite parts

Among the Greeks of the fifth century B.C, three kinds of rhetoric were clearly recognized: the symbouleutic rhetoric also referred to as 'deliberative speech or oratory'; the epideictic rhetoric otherwise called 'demonstrative speech'; and the judicial rhetoric also known as 'dicanic or forensic oratory or speech'. While the judicial (dicanic/forensic) oratory was practiced in the courts of law (*dikasteria*) and sometimes the assembly (*ekklesia*), the epideictic (demonstrative) oratory embraced all forms of funeral, panegyric and festival orations including sophistic oratory. The symbouleutic (demonstrative) oratory was common within the purview of politics,

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

olitical assemblies or history; it was the common ool of political demagogues. Historians such as lerodotus and Thucydides recorded great speech- credited to politicians and statesmen who were atly influenced by the rules of fifth century judi- ial speeches and techniques even though many of iem were not trained in rhetoric by the then travel- ng teachers, sophists. Many of these politicians and tatesmen neither prepared their speeches nor pub- shed them until much later when rhetoric became n art in literary form (Kennedy, 1963: 203–204).

At its beginning, the deliberative (symbouleutic) hetoric was not presented as published speeches as iany politicians never received formal training in olitical speaking in schools until the time of Ar- stotle and Anaximenes (Hudson-Williams, 1951. 68 ff). Unlike the judicial rhetoric which gained ider spread than any other by the fifth century, the eliberative art of persuasion did not gain popularity ntil much later, the earliest extant work — published nd delivered — being Andocides' *On the Peace with parta*. The event that facilitated its publication was arranted. Andocides, an Athenian, had been ex- led in 391 B. C. after he and his colleagues failed to he Athenians to make a truce with the Spartans on ccount of the protracted Peloponnesian War. In ex- le, he was forced to plead and seek justice through he publication of his political speech since he was in io way able to do in person at Athens. Apart from Andocides' work, other extant deliberative speeches ater published were the speeches of statesmen and oliticians such as Isocrates (*The Plantaicus, On the eace* and *Areopagiticus*) and Demosthenes (*On the hersonese* and *the Fourth Philippic*). As characteris- ic of the deliberative kind of oratory, many speeches, ublished or delivered with some educational tones, ere attempts at political persuasion.

Epideictic rhetoric etymologically derived from he term *epideixeis* (demonstrations), that is, speech- s that were neither deliberative nor judicial in na- e. Aristotle (Aristotle. *Rhetoric*, 1358b2ff) notes hat epideictic speeches aimed at the praise or blame of something of someone; they were intended to point out (demonstrate) the honourable and the dishonourable either by way of address to observ- ers, spectators or in form of a write up to be read out to them (Aristotle. *Rhetoric*, 1414 a 18). They are speeches, delivered, 'not for the sake of contest but of demonstration', to reflect the ability of the speaker (Aristotle. *Rhetoric*, 144 ob 13). Hence, epideictic speeches encompassed not only funeral, panegyric and festival orations but also all manners of encomi- um and invective speeches. Pericles is known to have delivered a famous funeral oration in 440 B.C in the wake of the plague that ravaged the Athenian camp during the stirring times of the Peloponnesian War (Thucydides, 2. 34–35). Other notable epideictic rhetoricians include Lysias, Georgias, Socrates, Hy- perides, Antisthenes, Hippias, etc.

The most prominent type of Greek oratory was the judicial one, the spread of which, as noted above was facilitated by the efflorescing of Athenian *demokratia* that required litigants to address the courts in defence or appeal. Although the Athenian court system allowed litigants to seek the assistance of third parties or advocates who could address the court, nevertheless, the litigants had to make their own speech first. Advocates worked both as speech writers and lawyers, searching for evidence, exam- ining the law and advising on the conduct of their clients. Sometimes the speech-writer lawyer could assist his client to rehearse by listening to the client's delivery of the written speech and advising him about necessary gestures and polishing of his oral presen- tation (Kennedy, 1963: 127–128). In this group of speech-writers, logographers and lawyers belonged, Antiphon, Lysias, Isaeus, Isocrates, Demosthenes, Hyperides and other lesser rhetoricians whose works were masterpieces of the art of persuasion.

Among the fifth century Greeks, the traditional theory of rhetoric recognised three main parts: in- vention (Grk. *euresis*), arrangement (Grk. *taxis*) and style (Grk. *lexis*). According to Kennedy, 'invention' (*euresis*) is the part of oratory that is concerned with

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

the subject itself, with finding out the grave questions at hand (called the *stasis*) and the appropriate argument that must be used in proof or repudiation. In this part, proofs would include, first, all direct evidence to support the *stasis* (Kennedy, 1963: 10–12). Such evidence could be witnesses, contracts, and oaths. Other proofs are the argumentations from the direct evidence and this would be done by means of syllogisms. Final proofs could require other means of persuasion such as the orator's use of emotional appeals, pathos, gestures, and passionate words — for instance, weeping children, slaughtered girls, famished orphans, bloody swords, anger and calmness, friendliness and enmity etc. (Aristotle. *Rhetoric*, 2.2.27).

Arrangement (*taxis*) refers to the organization of speech, both written and oral, into various segments. The segments are:

a) The prooemium (Grk. *prooimion*), which covers 'the introduction';

b) The narration (Grk. *diegesis*), which refers to 'the exposition' of the background and factual details;

c) The proof (Grk. *pistis*), which is a firmer exposition of the main body;

d) The conclusion or epilogue (Grk. *epilogos*), that is the summary and final submission.

All these segments have their functions. The prooemium is intended to secure the interest and attention of the audience from the start with the speaker giving an indication that he does not know how to speak eloquently. The narration aims at presenting brief, sharp and persuasive exposition of the unfolding issues at hand and must be supported firmly with evidential proofs. The conclusion aims at *stirring the emotion of the audience* through appeals, refutations, counter-refutations and recapitulation of points earlier affirmed or exposed at the beginning (Kennedy, 1963: 11).

Style (*lexis*) usually involves the organization of rhetorical speeches around four parameters of 'correctness' of details/facts; 'clarity' of speech to remove all ambiguities; 'propriety' of speech, methods, etc.; and adornment (ornamentation) with figures of speech, elevated diction, polished prose rhythm, etc. Various rhetoricians, between fifth and fourth centuries, either modified or expanded these basic tripartite segments of rhetoric by introducing the fourth and fifth segments respectively called 'memory' (Grk. *mneme*) and 'delivery' (*hypokrisis*). While 'memory' relates to the use of mnemonic strategies while delivering speech, 'delivery' refers to the control of voice (Kennedy, 1963: 11–12).

Speech as a key tool of persuasion

As with modern method, speech (*logos*), beside write-ups, was the single indispensable tool for the Greek art of persuasion; it was equally a requisite instrument for the Greek philosophers who sought the relationships between speech itself, truth, and morality. The Greeks' socio-political and cultural mechanics were primarily in form of oral expressions, best emblazoned in their classic democracy, judiciary, Homeric epics, entertainment, memoirs, myths, orations, literatures, philosophy, drama, and so on (Kennedy, 1963: 4). Several oral literatures only became written long after rhetoric had significantly expedited the leap in Greek intellectual life. The Graeco-Romans generally were aware of the crucial role of good speech, verbal expressions, as a tool for distinguishing humans (*homo sapientes*) from brutes. Quintilian, whose work sums up the tradition and theory of rhetoric, described the art as *'bene dicendi scientia'*, the science of speaking well (Quintilian, 2.15). For later writers after Quintilian, 'science' was not too convenient a term for rhetoric and so the term 'art' was preferred, the explanation being that 'oratory' refers to actual speech while 'rhetoric' would embrace both the speech and the theory or technique of good speaking or persuasion. On the overall, good verbal expression was the basis of civilization. And in the words of Isocrates (Isocrates. *Nicocles* 5 ff.; *Antidosis* 253 ff), even re-echoed by Cicero much later (Cicero. *De Oratore* 1.30 ff), speech is a *sine qua non* to any meaningful development, thought or action:

In most of our abilities we differ not at all from the animals; we are in fact behind in swiftness and

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

strength and other resources. But because there is born in us the power to persuade each other and to show ourselves whatever we wish, we not only have escaped from living as brutes, but also by coming together have founded cities and set up laws and invented arts; and speech has helped us attain practically all of the things we have devised. For it is speech that has made laws about justice and injustice, and honor and disgrace, without which provisions we should not be able to live together. By speech we refute the wicked and praise the good. By speech we educate the ignorant and inform the wise. We regard the ability to speak properly as the best sign of intelligence, and truthful, legal, and just speech is the reflection of a good and trustworthy soul. With speech we contest about disputes and investigate what is unknown. We use the same argument in public councils as we use in persuading private individuals. We call orators those who are able to discourse best among themselves. If I must sum up on this subject, we shall find that nothing done with intelligence is done without speech, but speech is the marshal of all actions and of thoughts and those who most use it have the greatest wisdom.

Aristotle's rhetoric: the tripartite means and functionality

According to tradition and if the work of Plutarch (*Lives of the Ten Orators*) is to be believed, there were ten distinguished Attic Greek orators, namely: Antiphon, Lysias, Andocides, Isocrates, Isaeus, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Hyperides, and Dinarchus. Aristotle, although featured most prominently in the field of philosophy, contributed quite significantly to the efflorescing of rhetoric through his monumental work, *Rhetoric*. Aristotle defines rhetoric as 'the counterpart (*antistrophos*) of dialectic (Arist. *Rhetoric*, 1.1.1–2). He says rhetoric is the ability of the *rhetor*, in grave situations, to see the available means of persuasion, and make use of the appropriate modes of persuasion — *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos* — the modes/terms are explained below. He also notes that rhetoric is a branch of philosophy along with logic and dialectic. To Aristotle, while logic is concerned with reasoning to reach some scientific certainty, rhetoric and dialectic are more focused on probability which is a subject or tool best fitted for human affairs. While dialectic is a tool for philosophical debates, rhetoric functions as a tool for practical debates, aimed at persuading a general audience through the use of practical matters.

Like the general traditional Greek theory, the Aristotelian oratory is also divided into three parts: the judicial (dicanic/forensic), the deliberative (symbouleutic) and the epideictic (demonstrative). The judicial oratory finds the law court as an avenue for its expression, while deliberative oratory is often made to advise political assemblies on the making of policies. The epideictic oratory is for ceremonial occasions of praise or blame over current events. In each, there is the conscious attempt to persuade the audience to perceive something in the light of a speaker's appraisal.

Persuasion, by Aristotelian theory, is rhetoric which functions by three means: by appeal of the speaker's personality or character (*ethos*), by the appeal to the audience's emotions (*pathos*), and by appeal to their reason (*logos*) (Corbett, 1990: 37). The Greek words, *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos* are, according to Aristotle, the three means of oratory. Ethos, basically, is a projection of personality or good character of the orator which must be worthy of respect from the audience. It is concerned with the establishment of the persuader's credibility. Pathos functions by putting the audience in an appropriate mood, by playing on its feelings. It is intended to evoke pity or anger from the audience by means of a speaker's deployment of *touching* words on the emotions or areas of psychic activity of the audience. Logos (logic) is a word which carries many meanings; in relation to rhetoric, its plainest meaning is 'rational argument' which is aimed at proving or disproving a matter or case under review (Lanham, 2012: 166). Logos must be a sound reasoning that will appeal to the audience.

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

Corbett writes in respect of the Aristotelian means of rhetoric (Corbett, 1990: 5):

Instead of moving on the surface as the ordinary rhetorician did, with his precepts for each part of the speech and each type of oration, Aristotle goes to the sources of persuasion. He investigates the form of rhetorical proofs, the enthymeme or incomplete syllogism, and the means of arousing emotion and of conveying a favorable impression of the speaker's character, which are to him excellent elements equal in importance to demonstration. Rhetoric thus connects on the one hand with dialectic, on the other with ethics and psychology; the orator must be able to syllogise and must also have knowledge of human character and emotions.

Ethos

By Aristotle standards, a person's good reputation naturally attracts respect from the society. An individual's wealth, social status and other contributions to the welfare of his community may also serve to enrich his already existing good reputation. An individual's wisdom, virtue, integrity, goodwill, and trustworthiness are some constituents of the ethical appeal. By inference, these aforementioned qualities are capable of producing arguments based on sound reasoning. The speech itself creates in the audience an impression that 'the speaker is a person of sound sense (*phronesis*), high moral character (*arête*), and benevolence (*eunoia*). It is the speech itself that must create this impression' (Corbett, 1990: 80). Since *ethos* is the ethical appeal thus focuses on reputation, caution must be taken by the orator as regards his conducts for every speech affords a speaker the opportunity of maintaining or building upon the already familiar reputation which he had among the audience. An iota of error or illogical reasoning may be perceived by the audience as a display of instability on the part of the speaker. Inconsistencies may be very severe for the speaker. Grave situations may occur where two speakers are pitched wit-for-wit against each other; one speaker may triumph over the other not because the truth was emphasized but because his ethos appealed more to the audience. Thus in ethos, character and charisma are brought to bear on the overall speech.

Pathos

Aristotle explains *pathos* as an appeal to the emotions of the audience. In this mode of persuasion, the witty speaker deploys every piercing word in his arsenal to effect desired responses and reactions from the audience, and since this means is more result-oriented in the forensic (dicanic) space, his target is usually at the jurors so that in the end justice will swing in his (or his client's) favor.

Appeals to audience's emotions usually mount pressure on the human will in such a manner that true or 'correct justices' may not run its full course, or worse still, become thwarted. The ability to conjure up images in the mind's eye is usually the calculated attempt of every skilled *rhetor*. He attempts to make the audience imagine a scenario that often evolves pity or anger. In doing this, the speaker could make use of exaggeration as a device of persuasion and appeal, especially in a situation where the speaker or even his client assumes a pitiable demeanor, or even resorts to acting skills to aid delivery in court. Oftentimes, a mode of persuasion may subtly manifest in a discourse where another mode features more prominently. Aristotle thus presupposes that pathos, although figures more prominently in judicial oratory, can also manifest in the deliberative oratory where ethos predictably holds sway because most policies are made as a result of direct legal tussle or influence. Both kinds of rhetorical discourses are similar in nature because a speaker either proposes or opposes an argument to the end that his proposition may be accepted.

Logos

Logos, the Aristotelian third mode of persuasion, is the skilled speaker's sound appeal to the reason of the audience. It is the orator's ability to argue constructively, based on sound logical proofs including testimonies, documents, scientific analysis, laws and other forms of evidence. This is most likely to draw

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

admiration and respect from an audience. Aristotle thus postulates two types of logical proof:

1. Deductive Argument:

In this regard, the proofs or premises must be scientifically demonstrated. Another term for scientifically proven deductive argument is *syllogism*. If the premises, however, are only probably true, the term for the argument is *enthymeme*. Syllogism and the enthymeme are the schematic devices used by Aristotle to analyze and test deductive reasoning. While syllogism is a three-line argument to state proof, enthymeme is often a two line structure, and may be referred to as an imperfect syllogism. Both expressions may be considered below:

Syllogism: All lecturers are honest; Professor Henry is a lecturer; Therefore, Professor Henry is an honest man.

Enthymeme: Professor Henry must be a lecturer; hence, he loves to talk and lecture.

In the syllogism, there is a combination of two truths or arguments arriving at a logical conclusion, while the enthymeme expresses a knowledge based on an observation, leading to a probable conclusion. Conclusions from both are often made with the use of function words such as 'therefore', 'hence', 'consequently', and so on.

2. Inductive Argument:

This type of argument is intended to appeal to the audience, the orator accounts for all instances to support the phenomenon or matter at hand. Such induction is also scientific. However, if only selected instances are cited, the argument is from examples (Lanham, 2012: 166). The inductive form of reasoning projects 'examples' as its logical equivalent, unlike the deductive which uses the enthymeme. While both proofs hinge on inferences, the inductive dwells so much on phenomena that could be easily verified, whereas 'statements' are the reference points of the deductive form of reasoning.

Speakers applying the inductive form of reasoning often allude to instances or situations that are similar to the one in view, to the end that an analogy could be drawn from both before a conclusion is arrived at. The example and the enthymeme share a common weakness, that is, the conclusion is often woven around a probability, even though the former may have strong persuasive value. By sound reasoning too, the opposing speaker might also allude to familiar circumstances where proposed measures, (perhaps as examples given by the first speaker) were taken, but negative results were achieved. In inductive argument, the appeals, argues or provides evidence from the particular to the general to arrive at desired conclusions, whereas the reverse is the case with the deductive counterpart. Thus, through deductive and inductive reasoning, the orator can reach a desired knowledge or proof.

Aristotle's three modes of rhetoric also relates to three kinds of times and audiences: the past, present and the future. The past is concerned with the forensic (judicial) type of rhetoric which deals with determining of facts and assigning faults. Here, one man accuses the other, while the other defends himself, both referring to events done in the past. The present refers to the demonstrative (epideictic) type of oratory which emphasizes values, praises and blames, rights and wrongs. In this case, all men, during funeral or ceremonial oratory, either praise or blame themselves in view of present or existing circumstances. As for the deliberative (symbouleutic) type of oratory, a kind of political debates, this relates to decision-making about what to do in the future. The political orator is concerned with policies that might influence the future, about things to be done or jettisoned and he argues in support of either.

Aristotle also believes that the audience is defined along three lines: the speaker, subject and the person being addressed — the last of which judges or determines the gravity or persuasiveness of the speech (Arist. *Rhetoric*, 1358b). The listener, who is being addressed, is similarly a three-party listener. He could be a juryman who would need to take decision based on appeal/speech before him concerning an event that happened in the pas or he could be an observer who merely makes decisions

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

or forms an opinion based on an orator's speech or skill of persuasion. Moreover, he could be an assembly man who needs to be convinced by the orator's speech so as to decide on future policies that would be of benefit to his people. Thus, in Aristotle's view, rhetoric is more associated with speaking than writing and functions in a number of ways. It enables the speaker to skillfully put forward truth and justice, where these have failed through inefficient speech. It provides effective defense; it enables the speaker to prove opposites and refute an opponent, who might be making unfair use of arguments (Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric*. Freese J. H. trans. xxxii). In retrospect, the table below provides a summary of both the Greek and Aristotle's three faces of rhetoric as examined in this paper.

Table 1.

	The three Types	The Three Parts	The Three Means	The Three Elements	The Three Times	The Three Listeners
Greek and Aristotelian Rhetoric	Symbouleutic/ Deliberative	Invention (*euresis*)	Ethos	Speaker	Future	Members of the assembly
	Epideictic/ Demonstrative	Arrangement (*taxis*)	Pathos	Speech	Present	Observers at ceremonials
	Judicial/ Dicanic	Style (*lexis*)	Logos	Listener	Past	Jurymen at the courts

Conclusion

The art of speaking and writing well, elegantly and effectively is rhetoric that is intended to persuade or influence people. Whether its product or language is completely true or otherwise is another issue. It however aims at persuading or motivating target audiences in specific situations by appealing to their emotional and logical sentiments and leveraging on their weakness or gullibility on a particular subject which they know little or nothing about. As seen in the foregoing, the ancient Greek theoreticians divided rhetoric into three types and segments. And by the recommendation of Aristotle, the art of persuasion can be executed through the modes of *pathos*, *ethos*, and *logos* for a speaker is not firm on his oratorical stand if he is not capable of possessing the minds of his audience by executing the three modes of persuasion in contexts of necessity. Thus, the art of persuasion is rhetoric, deployed in circumstances where difficulties arise in convincing an audience or providing the proof of a matter. And in situations where truth is literally missing and cases appear terribly bleak, probability, rather than dead end, would predictably be the next resort of the audience if the orator is able to effectively deploy a proper mode and method of Aristotelian rhetoric.

References:

1. Akinboye A., Goke & Adekannbi G. O. The Fundamental Principles of Greek Participatory Democracy for Contemporary Nigerian Community Development. Nigerian Community Development Journal. – Vol. 4, – June – 2016. – P. 100–116.
2. Aristotle. The Politics. T. A. Sinclair (trans.). Betty Radice (ed.), reprint edition, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. – 1979.
3. Aristotle, Rhetoric W., Rhys Roberts (trans.). Mockingbird Classics Publishing. – 2015.
4. Barker E. Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors. Routledge Library Editions. – 2009.
5. Cicero. On the Orator (De Oratore), Books 1–2. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackman. Harvard, London and New York: LOEB Classical Library No. 348. Harvard University Press. – 1942.

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

6. Clarke M. L., Rhetoric at Rome: A Historical Survey. D. H. Berry (rev). London: Cohen and West. – 1996.
7. Corbett P. J. Edward. Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. – 1990.
8. Diodorus Siculus. Universal History. ed. C. H. Oldfather, F. Walton et al. Harvard, London and New York: LOEB Classical Library, Harvard University Press. – 1967.
9. Aristotle. The 'Art' of Rhetoric. J. H. Freese (trans). London: LOEB Classical Library, Harvard University Press. – 1990.
10. Gagarin Michael. Probability and Persuasion: Plato and Early Greek Rhetoric. Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action. ed. Ian Worthington. Oxford, USA and Canada: Routledge. – 1994.
11. Hudson-Williams H.Li. Political Speeches in Athens. The Classical Quarterly, (1) – 1951. – P. 68–73.
12. Isocrates. On the Peace; Areopagiticus; Against the Sophists; Antidosis; Panathenaicus. – Vol. II. George Norlin (trans.): Loeb Classical Library, – No. 229. Harvard University Press. – 1929.
13. Isocrates. To Demonicus; To Nicocles; Nicocles or The Cyprians; Panegyricus; To Philip and Archidamus. Loeb Classical Library, – No. 209. Harvard University Press. – 1928.
14. Kennedy G. The Art of Persuasion in Greece. Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press. – 1963.
15. Lanham A., Richard. A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms. 2nd ed. California: University of California Press. – 2012.
16. Plato. The Republic. P. Sholey (trans.). 2 Vols. Loeb Classical Library, London: William Heinemann. – 1924.
17. Plato. Protagoras and Meno. Adam Beresford and Lesley Brown (trans.). Penguin Classics. – 2006.
18. Plutarch. Lives of the Ten Orators. John Dryden (trans.). USA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, OIA Press. – 2015.
19. Quintilian. Institutes of Oratory. John Selby Watson (trans.), Curtis Dozier and Lee Honeycutt (ed.). USA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, OIA Press. – 2015.
20. Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Ed. Rex Warner, USA: Penguin Classics. – 1972.
21. Worthington I. (ed.). The Art of Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action. Oxford, USA and Canada: Routledge. – 1994.

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

Contents

Section 1. History 3

Martirosyan Arman Rafikovich
THE POSITION OF THE SYRIAN ARMENIANS REGARDING THE ISSUES OF ALEXANDRET SANJAK DURING THE YEARS OF THE "SETTLEMENT" (1936–1939) 3

Morozova Anna Evgenjevna
"HARD BREXIT" VS. "SOFT BREXIT" IN THE UK 7

Nazim oglu Elvin Pashayev
POST-SANCTIONS IRAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND GLOBAL ENERGY MARKETS 11

Section 2. Cultural studies 15

'Goke A. Akinboye, Bosede Adefiola Adebowale
THE THREE FACES OF GREEK AND ARISTOTELIAN RHETORIC 15

Kocaevli Gülşen
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: LINGUISTIC INTEGRATION OF MEXICANS IN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKS IN GERMANY 25

Lapchuk Olesya Oleksandrivna
THE FESTIVAL OF UKRAINIAN SINGING POETRY «OBERIG» IN TIME AND SPACE 32

Section 3. Philology and linguistics 38

Lychuk Maria Ivanivna
COMPLETIVE ATTRIBUTIVE SYNTACTICALLY INDIVISIBLE WORD COMBINATIONS IN THE MODERN UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE 38

Malakhov Sergey Viktorovich
INVESTIGATION ON THE GOD OF DEATH SOKAR 43

Section 4. Pedagogy 65

Avramenko Olga Valentynivna, Biletska Yulia Hryhorivna
MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE OF STATEMENTS IN DISTANCE LEARNING COURSE OF CALCULUS 65

Bulku Altin, Kapedani Kujtim, Ikonomi Edison
STATISTICAL AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF A COMPETITION IN ALBANIAN WRESTLING 69

Kalizhanova U. S., Toleuzhanov K. T.
ON THE FUNDAMENTALS OF TEACHING ELECTRONICS AND MECHATRONICS IN EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS 73
MONITORING CHILDREN'S GROSS MOTOR COORDINATION DURING ONE YEAR; EVIDENCE BASED ON GENDER DIFFERENCES 76

Osova Olha
ZUR ROLLE DES LEHRERS IM FREMDSPRACHENUNTERRICHT MIT DER NEUEN MEDIEN 81

Ostapenko Anna Viktorivna
I. P. LVOV — HISTORICAL ACADEMIC FIGURE OF CHERNIHIV PEDAGOGICAL INSTITUTE 85

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

Popova Tetiana Semenivna
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE OF SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL WORK WITH CLIENTS OF THE PROBATION SERVICE IN UKRAINE 91

Section 5. Political science 96

Mirzazade Lilia Fridunovna
NEW POSSIBILITIES OF SATISFACTION OF AMBITIONS 96

Tsurtsumia Alexander
THE MAIN PHASES OF GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES IN ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION. (COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA AND KOSOVO) 100

Section 6. Psychology 106

Davydova Oksana Volodymyrivna
THE EXPERIENCE OF OVERCOMING EDUCATIONAL STEREOTYPES BY TEACHERS AND THEIR TYPICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 106

Rosca Maria
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EVALUATION AND SELF-ESTEEM IN PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE 111

Section 7. Sociology 118

Karimova Gulzirakhon
MAKHALLA AS AN INSTITUTION OF NATIONAL UPBRINGING 118

Mammadova Saadet Davud qizi
SOCIAL STATE AND SOCIALLY-ORIENTED MARKET ECONOMY 121

Uzakova Salima Andromasovna, Simonovich Nikolay Evgenievich, Kaliyeva Zhadra Abzhamievna
SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SECURITY OF AN INDIVIDUAL IN THE MODERN KAZAKH SOCIETY 125

Chen Nuo, Wang Betty
PREDICTING RISK OF BEING VICTIMS OF DATING VIOLENCE FOR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS USING ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORK 130

Section 8. Philology and linguistics 145

Gurbanova Shahla
EXIL DER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN AUTOREN 1933–1945 UND SEIN POSITIVER EINFLUSS AUF DIE GESCHICHTE DER WELTLITERATUR 145

Section 9. Philosophy 149

Mentuz Dimitry
"THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY" 149

Shikiyeva Sevda, Manafova Irada
ENGLISH INSTRUCTORS' PERSPECTIVES AS A FACILITATOR ABOUT TEACHING STRATEGIES, STUDENT MOTIVATION AND ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS 153

Shikhiyeva Sevda, Huseynova Arifa
MAXIMIZING LEARNING IN LARGE CLASSES 159

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

Section 10. Economics and management 163

Batirova Nilufar
THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND ATTRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO THIS SPHERE 163

Gabadadze Izolda, Mushkudiani Nino, Tsereteli Ineza
THE INTERRELATION OF MOTIVES AND STIMULI IN THE PROCESS OF A COMPANY'S MANAGEMENT 167

Fedulova Lyubov Ivanivna
PROBLEMS AND PRECONDITIONS OF UKRAINE REGIONS INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT 170

Section 11. Science of law 174

Khairullina Elmira Faritovna
LEGAL REGULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW: INTERACTION OF PROLEMS 174

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY